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NOTES
COVER v. SCHWARTZ*
PROGRESS towards a uniformly liberal treatment of procedural and jurisdic-
tional questions may be retarded by a recent decision I of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Cover, the owner of a patent, sued Schwartz
in a federal district court for infringement. Schwartz denied both the validity
of the patent and the infringement, and the court found in his favor declaring
the patent invalid and implying that it was not infringed. On appeal, Cover's
attorney said in his statement of points that the court erred in finding the
patent invalid and in failing to find the patent valid and infringed; but hin
the brief he said that appellant did not "challenge that part of the judgment
which holds the claims not infringed."
On the basis of this concession, the circuit court in an opinion by Judge
Frank dismissed the appeal and allowed the decision of the lower court
to stand, holding that since the issue of infringement had been eliminated,
there was no longer a case or controversy supporting the exercise of juris-
diction.2 In a vigorous dissent,3 judge Clark argued that the concession
should have been disregarded and the case heard in its entirety on the merits
and that even if the concession were binding, a justiciable controversy re-
mained.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would seem to support judge Clark's
contention that the concession should have been disregarded and the appeal
treated as one upon both the issue of infringement and the issue of validity.
It is the basic premise of the rules that if neither party is prejudiced, a case
should be heard upon its merits despite minor procedural objections.' In the
Cover case there was no possibility of prejudice to the defendant because
he was notified, by appellant's statement in his points, that both issues would
be litigated.
Moreover, the Federal Rules specifically relieve a party from a judgment
or order entered against him through his "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
* 133 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
1. Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
2. Contra: Alexander J. Bocz v. Hudson Motor Co., 19 F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Mich.
1937) (patent found invalid at plaintiff's request, although plaintiff had already conceded
non-infringement because of plaintiff's interest in the patent and in other suits then pend-
ing).
3. Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. (2d) 541, 547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
4. FED. Rui.as Civ. PRoc. 73, 75, simplify the method of bringing appeals. Courts
have dismissed appeals for non-compliance only in cases of actual prejudice to the de-
fendant. See Adams v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 121 F. (2d) SOS (C. C. A. 7th,
1941); Johnson v. Wilson, 118 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); Federal Land Bank
of Springfield v. Hansen, 113 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); Grand Lodge Improved
B. P. 0. Elks of the World v. Eureka Lodge, No. 5, Independent Elks, 114 F. (2d) 45
(C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ; Keeley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 113 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940); 3 MooRa, FEDERAL PRnAcrsC (1938) §§ 73.01, 75.01.
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or excusable neglect." 5 This rule has been broadly interpreted 0 and has
even been used to provide relief from an order of dismissal based upon a
stipulation which an attorney had signed without his client's consent.1 Al-
though this provision affords relief only after entry of a judgment or order,
it indicates that a party should not be penalized for technical procedural errors.
And in the interests of administrative convenience a court should correct
such errors when they first appear. The Federal Rules confer upon district
courts wide discretion in determining whether to dismiss a case after answer
is filed,8 and similar discretionary powers have been assumed by appellate
tribunals in dismissing or retaining an appeal. The extent of these powers
is suggested by the case of In re Barnett.9 There a bankrupt-assignor ap-
pealed from a decision holding his assignment invalid and ordering him to
execute an assignment of the same property to the trustee in bankruptcy.
Although the trustee consented to the deletion of this order and by this con-
cession deprived the appellant of his technical basis for appeal, the appellate
court in order to protect the interest of the assignee, who had failed to appeal,
refused to dismiss.
To have ignored the concession and treated the appeal as one upon both
issues would not have constituted a radical departure from established prac-
tice. Although courts are generally bound by concessions made for the put-
pose of narrowing the issues and expediting appeals, 10 and there is no ju-
dicial duty to ascertain whether a concession is warranted,"' a concession
may be disregarded when administrative benefits are overweighed by sub-
stantive detriment.1 2 But even if the court was bound by the concession of
non-infringement, it would seem that the remaining issue of validity presented
a justiciable controversy which warranted a declaration by the court on that
issue. The concept of a justiciable controversy has in recent years been greatly
5. FED. RULES CIv. PROC. 60(b).
6. See LaBarbera v. Grubard, 112 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (failure of
attorney to appear at a hearing); Kroell v. N. Y. Ambassador, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 294
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Nachod & U. S. Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 588 (Conn. 1940) (not applicable to error of court); Robins v. Pitcairn, 3 Fed.
Rules Serv. 60b.33 (case 2) (N. D. Ill. 1940) ; 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 60 b.21 (commentary)
7.' See Preveden v. Hahn, 36 F. Supp. 952 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
8. FED. RULES CIV. PROc. 41(a). See Oblak v. Armour & Co., 1 F. R. D. 648
(W. D. Mo. 1941) ; Forstner Chain Corp. v. Gemex Co., I F. R. D. 115 (D. N. J. 1940) ;
Scruggs v. Casco Corp., 32 F. Supp. 625 (D. Conn. 1940); Cheney Co. v. Cunningham,
29 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Stanley Works v. C. S. Mersick Co., 1 F. R. D. 43
(D. Conn. 1939).
9. 124 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), 51 YALE L. J. 1406. See (1938) 51 HAIv.
L. REV. 1058.
10. See Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U. S. 583, 609 (1868); F. W. Rauskolb Co. v.
Anthony Mfg. Co., 253 Fed. 650, 651 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918) ; Globe Securities Co. v. Gard-
ner Motor Co., 337 Mo. 177, 85 S. W. (2d) 561 (1935).
11. Benson & Marxer v. Regner, 186 Iowa 19, 172 N. W. 166 (1919).
12. See Ini re Barnett, 124 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; Rip Van Winkle Wall
Bed Co. v. Holmes, 15 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Knaust Bros. v. Goldsehlag,
28 F. Supp. 188 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Lewis Invisible Stitch Machine Co. v. Columbia
Blindstitch Machine Mfg. Corp., 22 F. Supp. 705 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
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expanded by judicial interpretation.' 3 Thus an actual rupture between two
parties is no longer necessary; mere uncertainty of the petitioner's legal
rights against a potentially adverse party has been deemed sufficient.14 A
patentee seeking a judicial decision on the validity of his patent before put-
ting his invention on the market might, therefore, be entitled to a declaration
on validity against the holder of a similar patent. In any event, he would cer-
tainly be entitled to such a declaration against a party who demonstrated his
adversity by contesting the patent's validity in court.
The decision in the Cover case that the concession of non-infringement
concluded the defendant's adverse interest might be justified if his interest
had been limited to the question of non-infringement. But the primary aim
of any litigant who is claimed to have infringed a patent is to have that patent
declared invalid because its mere existence jeopardizes his interests.15 A
finding of non-infringement effects only a limited estoppel on a patentee;
hence, he may still sue successfully upon his patent. A decree of invalidity,
on the other hand, acts as a complete estoppel, forestalling further litigation.10
Such a decree of invalidity is also important to the litigant from an extra-
legal standpoint since it extends the area of activity in which he can use and
develop his own device.
Courts recognizing the menace inherent in the existence of an invalid patent
monopoly have assured a purported infringer that the question of infringe-
ment may be reduced to litigation through his action as well as the patentee's
by permitting him to sue for a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-
infringement.1 7 And they have also guaranteed an alleged infringer that the
13. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937) ; Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941); Dewey & Almy Chemical Co.
v. American Anode, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943); Tremond Co. v. Schering
Corp., 122 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), 30 Gao. L. J. 213; Lances v. Letz, 115 F.
(2d) 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), (1941) 10 GEO. WAsu. L. Rnv. 241; BoncaAnm, DEacxA,-
TORY JUDGMxTS (2d ed. 1941).
14. See BORcHARD, DECLARTORY JtTUGENTS (2d ed. 1941); Borchard, Challctying
"Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Actions (1943) 52 YAuE L. J. 445, 446-53; Schroth, The
"Actal Controversy" in Declaratory Actions (1934) 20 Com:n. L. Q. 1, 12-14. In Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941), an insurance com-
pany sought and obtained a declaratory judgment of non-liability against an adverse
party whose interest depended upon the successful outcome of another suit then in pro-
cess and the failure of the insured to pay without recourse to the insurance company.
15. See Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 41 U. S. PAT. Q. 534 (S. D. X. Y. 1939);
Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 29 F. Supp. 343 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
16. Even if the decree were limited to the invalidation of certain claims only, the
patentee would hesitate to risk complete invalidation by further suit.
17. Some assertion of infringement by the patentee is generally considered essential
to these actions. See Tremond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 3d,
1941), 30 GEo. L. J. 213; Lances v. Letz, 115 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), (1941)
10 GEo. WASHi. L. Rnv. 241. But see Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. American Anode,
Inc., 137 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943). Here, the court permitted a declaratory judg-
ment action against a patentee although there had been no direct claim that the petition-
er's process infringed the patent. The court reasoned that the patentee created a con-
troversy by claiming in a suit against a third party a scope for his patent broad enough
to include the petitioner's process as an infringement.
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case will come to judgment on the merits by protecting him against a vol-
untary dismissal by the patentee either through an exercise of their discretion
under Federal Rule 41 (a),18 allowing dismissal only by order of court, or by
permitting him to inject a counter-claim for invalidity and non-infringe-
ment.1 But they have failed to stipulate that the decree in a patent suit must
always contain a finding of validity.
20
18. Counter-claim on the same issues as in plaintiff's complaint not permitted on
the ground that Rule 41(a) offered adequate protection against dismissal: Oblak v.
Armour & Co., 1 F. R. D. 648 (W. D. Mo. 1941); Forstner Chain Corp. v. Gemex
Co., 1 F. R. D. 115 (D. N. J. 1940); Scruggs v. Casco Corp., 32 F. Supp. 625 (D. Conn.
1940); Cheney Co. v. Cunningham, 29 F. Supp. 847 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Stanley Works
v. C. S. Mersick Co., 1 F. R. D. 43 (D. Conn. 1939).
19. See FED. RULES Civ. PROC. 13; Leach v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co., 104 F. (2d)
88 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Bechik v. Handy Mattress Accessories Corp., 45 F. Supp, 73
(E. D. N. Y. 1942); O'Leary v. Liggett Drug Co., I F. R. D. 272 (S. D. Ohio 1940);
Lambert v. Dempster Bros., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 610 (E. D. Tenn. 1940); Dewey & Almy
Chemical Co. v. Johnson Drake & Piper, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 1021 (E. D. N. Y. 1939);
Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 41 U. S. PAT. Q. 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); see Greg-
ory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 33 F. Supp. 870 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) (patent found invalid
on the merits) ; Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 29 F. Supp. 843 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) (coun-
ter-claim for invalidity allowed although plaintiff dismissed the infringement action);
Meinecke v. Eagle Druggists Supply Co., 19 F. Supp. 523 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); 1 MooaRE
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § 13.01.
20. Some judges have expressed the view that a decree should contain a finding on
invalidity where possible. See p. 915 infra. But for the general confusion of courts as
to the issues on which they will find in patent cases, see the following variety of results:
(a) Appeal court affirms on non-infringement alone. See Exhibit Supply Co. v.
Ace Corp., 315 U. S. 126 (1942). But see the dissent, id. at 137. See also Hazeltine Corp.
v. Emerson Television-Radio, Inc., 129 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) (dictum as to
invalidity); American Seating Co. v. Ideal Seating Co., 124 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 6th,
1941); Aleograph Co. v. Electrical Research Products,, 55 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932); Automatic Arc Welding Co. v. A. 0. Smith Co., 60 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 7th,
1932).
(b) Appeal court affirms on non-infringement alone, although lower court found
invalidity also. See Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290 (C. C. A, 2d,
1942) (Judge Frank concurring); Irwin & Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 121
F. (2d) 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; L. McBrine Co. v. Silverman, 121 F. (2d) 181 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1941) ; National Electric Signal Co. v. City of Waco, 94 F. (2d) 942 (C. C, A.
5th, 1938) ; American Can Co. v. M. J. B. Co., 59 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
(c) Appeal court affirms on non-infringement; lower court found valid and in-
fringed. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Davies, 112 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
(d) Appeal court affirms on both issues although one "immaterial," See Wheat-
ley v. Rex Hide, Inc., 102 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) (invalid, infringed).
(e) Appeal court finds patent valid though not infringed. See Oliver-Sherwood
Co. v. Patterson-Ballagh, 95 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). Contra: Electrical Fit-
tings Corp. v. Betts, 307 U. S. 241 (1939). See p. 916 in! ra.
(f) Lower court finds on unessential issue for benefit of appellate court. See B. F.
Sturtevant Co. v. Mass. Hair & Felt Co., 122 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) (in-
valid, infringed); Herman Body v. St. Louis Body & Equipment Co., 46 F. (2d) 879
(C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Kool Kooshion Mfg. Co. v. Mitchell Mfg. Co., 102 F. (2d) 37
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An appreciation of the purported infringer's particular interest in validi-
ty 21 is, however, indicated by decisions declaring that a plaintiff canntit by
conceding 2 2 or even consenting to a decree of non-infringement 2 deprive
the defendant of the right to litigate the question of validity. Yet in two
recent cases the courts have avoided a direct holding that the issue of validity
in itself does or does not constitute a justiciable controversy. In the first of
these,2 4 the appellate court struck out a finding uf invalidity made upon a
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Barry v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 31 F. Supp. 879 (N. D.
Ill. 1940), aff'd, 122 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) (valid, no infringement).
(g) Appeal court affirms on invalidity alone. See United Carbon Co. v. Binney
& Smith Co., 317 U. S. 228 (1942) (public interest in invalidity); B. F. Sturtevant Co.
v. Mass. Hair & Felt Co., 122 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. Ist, 1941) (lower court found
valid and not infringed); Bingham Pump Co. v. Edwards, 118 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A.
9th, 1941) (lower court found valid and infringed); Western Auto Supply Co. v.
American National Co., 114 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Grosjean v. Panther-
Panco Rubber Co., 113 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; Armstrong Cork Co. v. United
Cork Co., 107 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Noblitt Sparks Industries, Inc. v. Excel
Auto Radiator, 96 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); Herman Body v. St. Louis Body
& Equipment Co., 46 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) (lower court fuund only ,n-
infringement).
(h) Lower court finds invalidity alone. See Ware v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
Co., 20 F. Supp. 168 (D. Del. 1937), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
(i) Appeal court strikes out finding of validity from decree of valid and not in-
fringed. See Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Betts, 307 U. S. 241 (1939).
(j) Appeal court finds valid and not infringed. See Aluminum Co. of America v.
Thompson Products, 122 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). See also (1940) 9 Gzo.
WASa. L. REV. 236.
21. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Thompson Products, 122 F. (2d) 796 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1941) (defendant indicated his interest by filing cross-appeal) ; National Elec-
tric Signal Co. v. City of Waco, 94 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (defendant indi-
cated his interest by filing a motion to have the appellate court recall the mandate and
pass specifically on the issue of validity) ; Aleograph Co. v. Electrical Research Products,
Inc., 55 F. (2d) 106 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) (defendant indicated his interest in the issue
of invalidity by filing cross-appeal).
22. See Knaust Bros. v. Goldschlag, 28 F. Supp. 18 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (plaintiff
created a controversy by bringing the suit and could not dismiss his claim of infringe-
ment to deprive the defendant of a declaratory judgment of invalidity).
23. Lewis Invisible Stitch Machine Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Machine Mfg. Corp.,
22 F. Supp. 705 (S. D. N. Y. 1937) (because a patent was involved, court would not
permit the patent to hang as a threat over the art by permitting a withdrawal). For
recognition of the defendant's interest by other techniques, see Gregory v. Royal Typ2-
writer Co., 41 U. S. PAT. Q. 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (defendant entitled to counter-
claim for invalidity and non-infringement because Rule 41(a) while protecting against
dismissal might not protect against dismissal on non-infringement leaving issue of validity
unsettled).
24. Larson & Johnstone v. General Motors Corp., 134 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942), rcv'g 40 F. Supp. 570 (1941); accord, Bechik v. Handy Mattress Accessories
Corp., 45 F. Supp. 73 (E. D. N. Y. 1942). But cf. Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co.,
41 U. S. PAT. Q. 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Kolloff v. Ford Motor Co., 29 F. Supp. 843
(S. D. N. Y. 1939) (defendant entitled to a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-
infringement although plaintiff permitted to dismiss infringement action).
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defendant's counterclaim after entrance of a consent decree of non-infringe-
ment. Ignoring the question of justiciability, the decision held that the district
court in its discretion should have dismissed the counter-claim because under
the facts of the case plaintiff would otherwise have been deprived of a jury
trial in a second cause of action. In the second case 25 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a circuit court decision holding that a finding of non-
infringement rendered the question of the validity of plaintiff's patent moot.
But the precise ground for the Court's decision that the issue of validity con-
stituted a justiciable controversy was the existence of specific facts, apart
from the particular claims involved in the plaintiff's infringement action,
which rendered the patent a threat to the defendant. The caution of thLe
Court in failing to decide that a patent is per se 20 a threat to a defendant who
has once been forced into litigation would appear to be unfortunate.
21
25. Freeman v. Altvater, 55 U. S. PAr. Q. 125, rev'd, 130 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 8th,
1942), rez'd, 63 Sup. Ct. 1115 (U. S. 1943).
26. See Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 29 F. Supp. 843 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (defendant
entitled to a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement although plaintiff
permitted to dismiss infringement action); Gregory v. Royal Typewriter Co., 41 U. S.
PAT. Q. 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
27. It may also be argued that the appellate court in the Cover case was presented
with a controversy sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements, although entire-
ly different from the controversy in the court below. This controversy was between the
plaintiff and defendant as to the propriety of the lower court's decision. A substantial
legal right of pecuniary value had been taken from the plaintiff by the judgment of in-
validity, namely, the right to sue on his patent and had been given to the defendant in
the form of an estoppel. Since only the appellee was the beneficiary of the transfer and
only the appellant the victim of the deprivation both were certainly interested parties.
The view is interesting, moreover, as indicating a possible approach to the analysis
of appellate jurisdiction. While doctrinally an appellate court has no "original juris-
diction," the actual operativb facts of the "controversy" upon which the appellate court
bases its action may be substantially different than those which were the prerequisites
of a controversy in the Jower court. In an injunction suit by a patentee, for example, a
defendant abiding by an injunction already issued, is certainly no longer invading the
plaintiff's legal rights by his action. Here, the defendant, the party entitled to appeal,
is in a sense initiating an action to determine the propriety of the lower court's deter-
mination that he no longer has the privilege of marketing his product. By a showing that
the action of the lower court either through the relief granted or through its alteration
of the legal rights of the appealing party has deprived him of a right of substantial mone-
tary value, the prerequisites of a "justiciable controversy" are satisfied. This analysis
might also be offered as an explanation of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme
Court in the Betts case at the instance of a defendant in whose favour the decree had
been entered.
Since almost every appeal could be viewed under this analysis as a controversy as
to the validity of the lower court's judgment which alters the legal relations of the par-
ties to the financial detriment of either, it fails to satisfactorily explain why the appellate
court will exercise jurisdiction to hear the issue on which the alteration of legal rights
has been predicated, on the merits in one instance, while in the other it acts only to
strike out the finding of the lower court.
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In addition to the interest of the defendant, the interest of the public would
seem to have required the court to have heard the appeal in the Cover case.2-
Private litigation is the only method of testing a patent's validity except in
cases of fraud in the issuance.20 ' Moreover, the Supreme Court's high stand-
ard of "invention" 30 has indicated the existence of a large number of invalid
patents which should be eliminated. Thus in patent suits many courts adhere
to the policy of basing a decree adverse to the party claiming infringement
on invalidity whenever possible and of including a finding of invalidity in
the decree when non-infringement is found first."1  Although such a decree
is not in rem 32 and binds only the parties to the suit, the findings of fact may
be given weight in a subsequent suit on the same patent.P The view has been
expressed that the property interest of a patentee should entitle him to a
presumption of his patent's validity unless a finding on that issue is essential
to the disposition of a case. 4 An attitude of judicial restraint toward the
28. For cases recognizing the public's interest in patent suits, see United Carbln
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U. S. 228 (1942); Hill v. Wooster, 132 U. S. 693, 693
(1890) ; Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U. S. 375, 378 (1880). See also Exhibit Supply Co.
v. Ace Corp., 315 U. S. 126, 137 (1942) (Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas
dissenting); Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942) (Judge Frank concurring) ; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632, 633
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942) (Judge Frank concurring). For a comprehensive analysis of the
present patent system, see WNoodxwrard, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Prob-
lem of Administratize Law (1942) 55 H-,nv. L. REv. 950. Cases hold that an appeal oth-
erwise moot will not be dismissed because of public interest in the question. See Pip2r
v. Hawley, 179 Cal. 10, 175 Pac. 417 (1918) ; Pitt v. Belote, 108 Fla. 292, 146 So. 3M0
(1933) ; State ex rel Jones v. Wurdeman, 309 Mo. 403, 274 S. V. 407 (1925) ; Dove v.
Oglesby, 114 Okla. 144, 244 Pac. 798 (1926); Cox v. City Council of Bristol, 144 Va.
286, 132 S. E. 187 (1926).
29. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632, 638 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942)
(Judge Frank concurring) ; Aero Spark Plug Cu., Inc. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290.
292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) (Judge Frank concurring) ; Woodvard, supra nute 28, at 953-55.
30. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F. (2d) 632 (C. C A. 2d, 1942); Arm-
strong Cork Co. v. United Cork Co., 24 F. Supp. 913 (D. N. J. 1938), aff'd, 107 F. (2d)
36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Woodward, loc. cit. spra note 28; Evans, Disposition of Patent
Cases by the Court (1942) 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 19.
31. See Densmore v. Scofield, 102 U. S. 375 (18,0). For an excellent statement of
this policy, see Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A.
2d, 1942) (Judge Frank concurring).
32. See Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U. S. 294 (1917); Kessler v.
Eldred, 206 U. S. 285 (1907); Rousso v. First Nat. Bank in Detroit, 37 F. (2d) 281
(C. C. A. 6th, 1930) (not res adjudicata as between patents in different hands) ; Vapir
Car Heating Co. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Co., 7 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d,
1925) ; (1941) 9 Gro. WASH. L. Rav. 977.
33. See Murray v. Detroit Wire Spring Co., 206 Fed. 465 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).
34. Clapp v. Stewart Warner Corp., 116 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) (plaintiff
given the benefit of the presumption of validity) ; Armstrong Curk Co. v. United Cor:
Co., 107 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (presumption characterized as "esprit de pat-
entability"); Automatic Arc Welding Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 60 F. (2d) 740 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1932) [no finding on validity because time reveals prior art and tests utility of
patent; (1940) 9 GEO. WAsI. L. REv. 23il.
1943]
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rights of a private individual would seem, however, to be unwarranted even
in ordinary circumstances. And in patent cases, in which the property interest
is a monopoly vested in the individual by virtue of a public grant, precisely
the opposite attitude would appear to be required. 0
Furthermore, even if the issue of validity was moot, it would seem that
the court in the Cover case should not have permitted the lower court's decree
of invalidity to stand. Judge Frank argues that the court's inaction achieves
the happy result of satisfying the interests of both the public and the de-
fendant in a finding of invalidity; but he ignores entirely the equally im-
portant interest of the plaintiff, who is denied by the decision an opportunity
to appeal and yet is burdened by a decree which may later operate as an estop-
pel against him.
Under similar circumstances the lower court's decree has generally been
dismissed, so that a party unable to appeal may litigate the issues in a subse-
quent case.30 The Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned this policy of pro-
tecting a party from estoppel as to an issue from which he has not been able to
take an appeal on the merits. In Electrical Fittings Corporation v. Belts 7 a
defendant was permitted to appeal from a favorable decree of valid but not
infringed in order to have the appellate court strike the finding of validity.
The finding though "immaterial" was included in the decree and stood as an
"adjudication of one of the issues litigated." 38 Although Judge Frank at-
tempts to distinguish the Betts decision by arguing that the action of the ap-
pellate court in the Cover case will not prejudice the defendant, the policy
of the Betts case is hardly restricted to protection of defendants.
A complete dismissal in the Cover case would, however, have been contrary
to the trend in patent litigation which guarantees a defendant some decision
on the merits.39 Yet a mandate equitable to both the plaintiff and the defendant
could have been issued. The court, exercising its discretion, might have
treated the concession as a consent to a decree of non-infringement and
directed the lower court to enter such a decree, leaving the issue oi validity
undecided.
35. See Knaust Bros. v. Goldschlag, 28 F. Supp. 188 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Lewis
Invisible Stitch Machine Co. v. Columbia Blindstitch Machine Mfg. Corp., 22 F. Supp,
705 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). For the same policy applied to copyrights, see Basevi v. Edward
O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
36. See Leader v. Apex Hosiery Co., 108 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; 1 MooaE,
FEDERAL PRaACrcE (Supp. 1942) §§ 2.044, 2.048; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment
(1942) 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 15-18.
37. Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Betts, 307 U. S. 241 (1939).
38. Ibid.
39. See p. 912 supra.
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RIGHTS OF REGISTERED CO-OWNERS AND BENEFICIARIES
OF UNITED STATES WAR SAVINGS BONDS
RECENT judicial decisions applying state rules of testamentary transfer to
defeat the rights of registered beneficiaries of United States Var Savings
Bonds 1 have provoked severe criticism from courts, legislators, and com-
mentators. 2 The federal regulations governing the issuance of these bonds
permit a purchaser to register his bbnd in the name of a co-owner 3 ur bene-
ficiary 4 and provide that ownership of the bond shall vest in the registree
if the purchaser dies prior to maturity. Consistent judicial nullification of
this easy method of transfer might impair the attractiveness of the bonds
to purchasers in low income brackets, to whom the bond sale is primarily
directed.5
1. These decisions have been rendered in controversies between administrators of
the estates of war bond purchasers and the beneficiaries or co-owners. See Sinift
v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 57, 293 N. NV. 841 (1940); Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859,
36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 540, 92 P. (2d) 254
(1939). For the unfortunate results of such a holding, see In re Karlinsi's Estate, 33
N. Y. S. (2d) 297 (Surr. Ct 1942). Here the bonds were invalidated by rule of thumb
treatment, although a partnership contract providing that assets of the partnership should
vest in the surviving partner was upheld as not testamentary.
2. See it re Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943) [Surrogate
Foley's opinion emphatically contradicting the decision in Deyo v. Adams, 178 Mice. 859,
36 N. Y. S. 734 (2d) (Sup. Ct 1942)]; Rrroar or N. Y. L.&w REv. Commt. (1943);
Butler, Recommended Legislation Respecting United States 'Beneficiary' W'ar Bonds,
N. Y. L. J., Dec. 28-30, 1942, p. 2052, col 1, p. 2064, col. 1, p. 2080, col. 1; (1943) 43
Cot. L. REV. 260; (1943) 56 HAxv. L. REv. 1007; (1943) 27 Mizm. L. REv. 401.
3. See 7 FED. REG. 5158, § 315A(b) (1942) (providing for registration in co-own-
ership form). "During the lives of both coowners the bond will be paid to either ca-
owner upon his separate request without requiring the signature of the other coovner;
and upon payment to either coowner the other person shall cease to have any interest
in the bond." Id. at 5163, § 315.32(a).
"If either coowner dies without having presented and surrendered the bond for pay-
ment to a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department, the surviving ceowner
will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond and payment will be made
only to him." Id. at 5163, §315.32(b).
4. See 7 FED. REG. 5158, § 315.4(c) (1942) (providing for registration in beneficiary
form). "Payment or reissue to beneficiary. If the registered owner dies without having
presented and surrendered the bond for payment or authorized reissue to a Federal Re-
serve Bank or the Treasury Department, and is survived by the beneficiary, upon pro4d
of such death and survivorship, the beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and abso-
lute owner of the bond, and it will be paid only to him, or may be reissued in his name
alone, or otherwise reissued in accordance with Subpart J as though it were registered in
his name alone." Id. at 5163, § 315.36. The regulations also provide that the "form of
registration must express the actual ownership" and will be treated as "conclusive of such
ownership." Id. at 5158, §315.2 (1943).
S. See United States v. Sacks, 257 U. S. 37, 41 (1921) : In re Deyt's Estate, 42
N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (Surr. Ct 1943) ; Matter of Owens' Estate, 177 Misc. 1005, 32 N. Y.
S. (2d) 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
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These decisions attempt to justify the application of state laws of transfer
by a narrow construction of the federal regulations. 6 According to this view,
the regulations were designed purely for the convenience of the Government
in making payments and do not preclude a judicial determination of the rights
of parties to retain the proceeds of the bonds. Support for this position is
found in judicial holdings to the effect that the provisions of state banking
laws authorizing payment by banks to the survivor in a joint deposit arrange-
ment are intended for the protection of the banks and do not establish a right
in the survivor to the monies in the deposit.7 But, the comparison between the
federal regulations and state banking laws would seem to be unwarranted.
The regulations were not enacted solely to protect the Government,8 as these
state laws were enacted to protect banks,9 but constitute a part of a compre-
hensive scheme of financing and seek to induce purchases through the privi-
leges of registration.' The provision in the regulations that ownership as
well* as a right to the proceeds shall vest in the co-owner or beneficiary in-
dicates that the primary emphasis is on transfer of title rather than on con-
venience of payment. Moreover, while a failure to interpret the banking laws
as creating a presumption of the depositor's intent to vest title in the named
co-depositor may be reasonable in view of the common practice of setting up
joint deposits for purposes of convenience," no substantial reason exists for
failing to presume that a bond purchaser intends to confer a benefit in the
nature of a gift by designation of another party as co-owner or beneficiary.
6. This interpretation was first made in Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.
(2d) 254 (1939), in order to distinguish Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634 (1929),
cert. denied, 281 U. S. 739 (1930), where an action was brought to compel the Secretary
of the Treasury to pay the administratrix of an estate instead of the beneficiaries of cer-
tain Treasury certificates. It was held that payment could be made only to the benefi-
ciaries. See also Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 57, 293 N. W. 841 (1940); Deyo v. Adams,
178 Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942). Contra: In re Stanley's Estate,
102 Colo. 422, 80 P. (2d) 332 (1938); Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133
N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854 (Ch. 1943) ; In re Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379
(Surr. Ct. 1943) ; Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22 Ohio 0. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
See, for example, Godwin v. Godwin, 141 Miss. 633, 639, 107 So. 13, 14 (1925) ; Rice
v. Bennington County Savings Bank, 93 Vt. 493, 503, 108 Atl. 708, 712 (1920) ; Marshall
& Ilsley Bank v. Voigt, 214 Wis. 27, 252 N. W. 355 (1934).
. 7. For analysis of effect of the various state banking laws, see (1929) 15 CoRN. L.
Q. 96. For a comparison of the federal regulations and the state banking laws, see
Sinift v. Sinift, 229 Iowa 57, 88, 293 N. W. 841, 856 (1940). See also Moskowitz v.
Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 400, 167 N. E. 506, 512 (1929) ; Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N.
Y. 219, 174 N. E. 460 (1931) (statute, more than a mere protection to banks, created
presumption of joint tenancy, conclusive at the death of the purchaser).
8. See In re Stanley's Estate, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. (2d) 332 (1938); Franklin
Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854 (Ch. 1943) ; In re
Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943); Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22
Ohio 0. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
9. See (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q. 96.
10. See It re Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (1943) (to adopt the double
interpretation would be to "mock" the purchaser).
11. See Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940 (1889), 137 N. Y. 59, 32
N. E. 998 (1893) ; Gulliver, Classification of Gratuitpus Transfers (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 1.
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A more satisfactory judicial interpretation of the regulations is suggested
by decisions which view the regulations broadly, holding that they determine
the disposition of the proceeds of the bonds and because they constitute a
part of the supreme law of the land, state legislation may not properly inter-
fere with them.1 2 The Federal Constitution empowers Congress to borrow
money on the credit of the United States, 13 and federal statutes authorizing
the issuance of war bonds 14 are a proper exercise of this power.20  Since
administrative regulations made within the realm of delegated authority are
equally the supreme law of the land,1 it would seem that the regulations of
the Secretary of the Treasury issued in pursuance of the War Bond Act
should control both the payment by the Government and the rights of owner-
ship.
State declaratory legislation enacted subsequent to the decisions invoking
local laws of transfer have also stated that the provisions of the federal regu-
lations are decisive of the rights of the beneficiary or co-owner. A California
statute substantially reenacts the provisions of the regulations and provides
for incorporation of subsequent alterations in the federal law,17 while a New
York statute expressly stipulates that the right of an owner, co-owner or
beneficiary of a war bond shall not be impaired by any state statute govern-
ing transfers of property.' 8
12. See Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 739
(1930). See also In re Stanley's Estate, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. (2d) 332 (1938) ; Frarlin
Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11. 28 A. (2d) 854 (Ch. 1943); In re
Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (Surr. Ct 1943) ; Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22
Ohio 0. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
13. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8.
14. For the current federal statute, see 55 STAT. 7 (1941), 31 U. S. C. § 757(c)
(Supp. 1942).
15. See Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 28 A. (2d) 854
(Ch. 1943) ; Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22 Ohio 0. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
16. See United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223 (1914) ; United States v. Janoaitz,
257 U. S. 42 (1921) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 342, 349 (1920).
17. Calif. Laws 1943, c. 51:
"All United States savings bonds or other bonds or obligations of the
United States, however designated, now or hereafter issued, which are regis-
tered in the names of two persons as co-owners in the alternative, shall, upon
the death of either of the registered co-owners, become the sole and absolute
property of the surviving co-owner, unless the Federal laws under which
such bonds or other obligations were issued or the regulations governing the
issuance thereof, made pursuant to such laws, provide otherwise.
"All United States Savings Bonds or other bonds or obligations of the
United States, however designated, now or hereafter issued, which are regis-
tered in the name of one person payable on death to a named survivor shall
upon the death of the registered owner, become the sole and absolute prop-
erty of the surviving beneficiary named therein, unless Federal laws under
which such bonds or other obligations were issued or the regulations govern-
ing the issuance thereof, made pursuant to such laws, provide otherwise.
"This section shall not be construed to mean that prior to the enactment
hereof the law of this State was otherwise than as herein provided."
18. N.Y. Laws 1943, c. 632, §24: "Where any United States savings bond is payable
to a designated person, whether as owner, co-owner or beneficiary, and such bond is not
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But even under a narrow construction of the regulations which makes the
ordinary state rules of transfer applicable, the rights of the beneficiary or
co-owner may justifiably be sustained. Invalidation of these rights is neces-
sitated only by a judicial assumption that there are only two types of gratui-
tous transfers, gifts inter vivos and testamentary transfers.1 9 An inter vivos
gift of the bonds by the registered owner is, in fact, impossible. There can
be no actual delivery of non-transferable bonds,20 and registratibn is deemed
insufficient as constructive delivery in view of the purchaser's control of the
proceeds through the privilege of cashing the bonds prior to maturity.., As
a testamentary transfer, the registration must fail because it does not comply
with the formalities required by the Statute of Wills.
If, however, the bond is classified as a contractual transaction between the
Federal Government and the purchaser, payment to the co-owner or bene-
ficiary may be sustained as the performance of a conditional promise for the
benefit of a third party.22 In most states a donee beneficiary may unquestion-
ably enforce a contract made for his benefit.2 3 The requirement that a present
interest must pass to render such a contract immediately effective when pay-
ment is not to be made until death is satisfied by the view that the co-owner
or beneficiary is the recipient of a present vested conditional interest sub-
ject only to be divested by the purchaser's redemption or maturity of the
bonds.24 This position is supported by the uniform approval of similar con-
tracts contingent upon the death of a contracting party.2 5
transferable, the right of such person to receive payment of such bonds according to its
terms, and the ownership of the money so received, shall not be defeated or impaired by
any statute or rule of law governing transfer of property by will or gift or an intestacy,
provided, however, that nothing herein shall limit article ten of the debtor and creditor
law or section one hundred twenty-four of the decedent estate law."
19. See Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939) ; Deyo v. Adams,
178 Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942). For a discussion of the problem
of classification, see Gulliver, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers (1941) 51 YALE
L. J. 1.
20. The regulations prohibit transfer. 7 FED. REG. 5159, § 315.8 (1942). For the hold-
ing that there can be no gift of the bonds, see Matter of Owens' Estate, 177 Misc. 1006,
32 N. Y. S. (2d) 747 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
21. See Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; Deck-
er v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939).
22. For a clear statement of the theory, see In re Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d)
379, 387-88 (Surr. Ct. 1943). See also Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634, 638-39
(1929), cert. denied, 28 U. S. 739 (1930) ; Franclin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram,
133 N. J. Eq. 11, 28 A. (2d) 854 (Ch. 1943); Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22 Ohio 0.
265 (Prob. Ct. 1942). See also the dissenting opinion in Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash,
549, 555, 92 P. (2d) 254, 257 (1939).
23. See Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918) (right of third-party
beneficiary limited to particular classes) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 356,
357; (1943) 27 MINN. L. REv. 399, 400.
24. See Indiana National Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 180 Ind. 9, 101 N. E. 289 (1913)
Farra v. Braman, 171 Ind. 529, 86 N. E. 843 (1909); Sullivan v. Maroney, 77 N. J.
Eq. 565, 78 Atl. 150 (1910) ; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 147.
25. See insurance contracts, inter vivos trusts in which payment to the cestui is con-
tingent upon death, employees' stock purchase plans and Totten Trusts.
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Even when the contracting party retains powers sufficient to prevent pay-
ment, such contracts are sustained by the courts as sui gencris and not subject
to the requirements for testamentary transfers. In insurance contracts the pur-
chaser often reserves the privilege of altering the beneficiary, " and the settlor
of a trust payable on death may retain a power of revocation.27 The creator
of a Totten trust can, by withdrawal of the proceeds, defeat the survivor's
interest. -8 And an employee investing in a stock purchase plan may by cash-
ing the certificates render the beneficiary's rights ineffective.2 The fact that
the purchaser of a war bond may cash the bonds prior to maturity should
not. therefore, preclude enforcement of the contract.a°
The rights of the co-owner or beneficiary may also be sustained by com-
paring the bond to a joint bank account,, payable to either party or survivor.
Theories used by the courts to uphold the right of the survivor to the monies
in such an account 31 are equally applicable to war bonds.32 The regulations
might be deemed to create a conclusive presumption of joint tenancy as does
the New York Banking Law.m Or a beneficiary's rights to a war bond
might be upheld, as they have been in Ohio, by the third-party beneficiary
rationale through which payment to the survivor of a joint bank account
has been justified.
34
Although it would appear that the rights of the beneficiary or co-owner
should be sustained under state rules in almost every case, a few situations
26. See In re Deyo's Estate, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379, 38 (Surr. Ct. 1943) (applica-
tion of New York third-party beneficiary rule).
27. For cases holding that a privilege of revocation does n*ot make a trust testamen-
tary, see Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E. 257 (187) ; Robb v. Washingtcn
Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, 78 N. F_. 359 (1905).
28. See Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 7401, 752 (1904).
29. See In re Koss' Estate, 106 N. J. Eq. 323, 150 Atl. 360 (1930) ; Gulliver, Classi-
fication of Gratuitous Transfers (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 1.
30. The owner of the bond may not, moreover, secure its reissuance to eliminate the
beneficiary. See 7 FED. REG. 5158, § 315.35 (1942). See also id. at 5163, §315.32(a) (a
bond issued in co-ownership form may not be reissued except upon the signed application
of both co-o-nmers).
31. A few courts view such bank accounts as attempted gifts inter vivos, holding
that the form of the account fails as a constructive delivery because the creator retains
control through access to the deposits. See. e.g., Morristown Trust Co. v. Capsticl:, 90
N. J. Eq. 22, 106 At. 391 (1919) ; (1941) 16 WAsH. L. REv. 105.
32. Some state statutes create a presumption of joint-tenancy. See (1943) 52 Ymu.
L. J. 656, 658, n. 21; (1941) 16 WAsH. L. REv. 105, 106; (1938) 13 As. L REv. 230;
(1926) 54 VAsH. L. REI. 745. And some courts apply the theory independently. See
Quigley v. Quigley, 85 F. (2d) 300 (App. D. C. 1936) ; Attfy Gen. v. Clark, = Mass.
291, 110 N. E. 299 (1915). Although some courts applying a contractual theory to the
account require joint contributions, others apply the theory even when the supposed co-
owner is ignorant of the existence of the account. Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n Co.,
138 Ohio St 273, 34 N. E. (2d) 757 (1941). See (1941) 16 W.%sn. L REv. 105, 107-08.
33. See Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 400, 167 N. E. 506, 512 (1929) ; Mfar-
row v. Moskowitz, 255 N. Y. 219, 174 N. E. 460 (1931).
34. In this case the bond was registered in beneficiary form. See Laufersweiler v.
Richmond, 22 Ohio 0. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
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may exist where other considerations may properly override his interest. For
example, this interest might perhaps be subordinated to the rights of creditors
of the purchaser's estate. In Decker v. Fowler,", which invalidated the in-
terest of a beneficiary, it was said that a contrary holding would permit
possible misuse of the bonds to defeat the rights of creditors. And the New
York declaratory statute expressly provides protection for creditors" hii-
though the federal regulations state that the rights of creditors may not impair
the rights of survivorship conferred upon co-owners or beneficiaries.37 Possi-
bly invalidation of the rights of a beneficiary is also justified in some instances
which involve the statutory rights of a surviving spouse under laws which
guarantee him a specified share of the decedent's estate."' Transfers other-
wise valid have been set aside -because of these statutes if they were "il-
lusory" ;39 and the control which the purchaser oi a war bond retains over
the proceeds by virtue of his right to cash the bond might permit classification
of a co-ownership or beneficiary registration as an illusory transfer.40 Such
inroads upon the rights of the registered transferees should, however, be made
with judicial circumspection.
JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURTS OVER NON-FEDERAL
CLAIMS WHEN JOINED WITH A FEDERAL QUESTION*
COMPLAINTS joining claims of trade-mark, copyright or patent infringe-
ment, based on federal statutes, with common law allegations of unfair com-
petition often present close questions of federal jurisdiction.' The essential
35. 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939).
36. See N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 632: ". . . provided, however, that nothing herein
shall limit article ten of the debtor and creditor law or section one hundred twenty-four
of the decedent estate law."
37. 7 FED. REG. 5165, § 315.51 (1942) : "Creditors' Rights. A creditor of the owner
of a savings bond may secure payment thereof to the extent of the owner's interest, or to
the extent of the creditor's claim, whichever is smaller, through valid judicial proceed-
ings: Provided, however, That no such proceedings will be recognized if they would
give effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of the bond or would defeat or
impair the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon coowners and
beneficiaries."
38. For a catalogue of state statutory provisions, see 3 VERNIER, AmRmICAm FAMILY
LAWS (1931) §§188, 189.
39. See Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 381, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 969 (1937) ; Krause
v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. (2d) 779 (1941) ; Note (1943) 52 YAtX L. 5. 656.
40. But see Inda v. Inda, 288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. (2d) 59 (1942), aff'g 263 App,
Div. 925, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 1008 (4th Dep't 1942), aff'g without opinion 32 N. Y. S.
(2d) 1001 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
* Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur & Sons, 127 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942);
Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Pure Oil
Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
1. For discussions of the general problem, see 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PacAric" (1938)
155-65; Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Proceduro
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issue in these cases is whether the federal courts may have jurisdiction over
the non-federal matter. Traditionally, most courts refused to retain the non-
federal claim when there was no diversity of citizenship, 2 and some failed
to take such jurisdiction even when diversity could be shown.3 A minorit,,
however, citing Siler v. Louisville & r Nashvilh Railroad,4 retained control
even though the federal issue had been decided adversely to the plaintiff.
In Hurn v. Oursler0 the United States Supreme Court resolved this con-
flict in favor of the doctrine announced in the Sih'r case but in turn introduced
problems which have left the law on the subject as uncertain as ever. In
the Hurn case the petitioner sought relief on three claims: (I ) copyright
infringement; (2) unfair competition in an unauthorized use of petitioner's
play; and (3) unfair competition as to an uncopyrighted version thereof.
Because the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over the first and second
of these claims, the case is usually cited for the general proposition that in-
fringement and unfair competition claims may be tried together in the ab-
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393; (1926) 40 HLkRv. L. RE:v 298; (1934) 1 U. oF Cur. L Rv.
480.
2. See Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 255 U. S. 50, 52 (1921); Geneva Furniture Mfg.
Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 238 U. S. 254 (1915) ; Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt
Co., 220 U. S. 446, 456 (1911); Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U. S. 165
(1906); Elgin National Watch Case Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665, 667
(1901); Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 10 F. (2d) 26 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Planten v.
Gedney, 224 Fed. 382 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) (trade-mark valid and infringed); Schiebel
v. Clark, 217 Fed. 760 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914) (patent invalid); Faehndrich Y. Wheeler
Riddle Cheese Co., 34 F. (2d) 43 (E. D. N. Y. 1929) (trade-mark valid not infringed).
3. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115, 120 (C. C. A. 2d
1932); accord, Tullar & Tullar v. Illinois Central R. R., 213 Fed. 280, 2-3 (N. D. Iowa
1914). But cf. Bedell v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 245 Fed. 78S (N. D. Ohio 1917);
Strother v. Union Pacific R. R., 220 Fed. 731 (,V. D. Mo. 1915).
4. 213 U. S. 175, 191 (1909). The Court asserted the principle in this case that where
the federal questions raised by the bill are not merely colorable but are raised in good
faith, the circuit court has jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, has "the right
to decide all the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal questions ad-
versely to the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided
the case on local or state questions only." See Comment (1933) 33 CoCL L Rzv. 295.
5. In Lincoln Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 264 (1919), the Court observed in
handling a contention that the ordinance could be attacked only for a reason founded in
federal law that "even without diversity of citizenship . . . the jurisdiction extended to
the determination of all questions, including questions of state law, irrespective of the
disposition made of the federal questions." [citing Greene v. Louisville, 244 U.S. 499,503
(1917)]. Again in Atlantic Co. v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413, 416 (1923), and in South-
ern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 522 (1923), the principle is clearly recognized. But cf.
Illinois National Watch Co. v. Elgin Watch-Case Co., 94 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899),
aff'd, 179 U. S. 665 (1901), where the circuit court stated that it was, of course, clear that
the bill could not be sustained unless the federal right was sustained. See also Vogue Co.
v. Vogue Hat Co., 12 F. (2d) 991, 993 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; General Inv. Co. v. Lale
Shore & M. S. R. R., 269 Fed. 235, 241 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920).
6. 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
7. See (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1339; (1934) 32 Mien. L. REv. 412.
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sence of diversity of citizenship.8 There were attached to this liberal rule,
however, two qualifications which practically nullified its force. First, in
retaining jurisdiction over the second claim the Court observed, "The claims
of infringement and unfair competition so precisely rest upon identical facts
as to be little more than different epithets to characterize the same group of
circumstances." 9 Many courts have found justification in the italicized words
for restricting the Hum rule to situations where facts necessary to support
trade-mark, patent and copyright infringement and unfair competition are
identical. 10 Second, the Court dismissed the third claim for want of juris-
diction, citing Stark Brothers Company v. Stark," which refused to allow
the plaintiff to recover for the defendant's conduct prior to registration.1"
By the application of this rationale the Hurn opinion invited lower courts
unfriendly to the general proposition for which the decision stands to dis-
tinguish the chief holding on slightly dissimilar facts, and, what is more,
cited the Hurn case as authority.13 On the other hand, some courts have ap-
plied the rule liberally, allowing any substantially interwoven federal and non-
federal claims to be tried together.'
4
8. See Warner Publications v. Popular Publications, 87 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) ; L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). See also Judge
Clark's dissent in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F. (2d) 16, 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). How-
ever, in Atkins v. Gordon, 86 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), the Hum case was
neither followed nor cited. Plaintiff sued for patent infringement and for unfair compe-
tition. The court held that (a) the patent was not infringed; (b) it was valid; (c) "it
[was] unnecessary to discuss to the unfair trade method charges, for in view of the resi-
dence of the parties in the same state, the Federal court's jurisdiction [was) dependent
upon appellee's sustaining the patent infringement charge of the complaint." Id. at 597.
9. 289 U. S. 238, 246 (1933).
10. See Foster D. Snell v. Potters, 88 F. (2d) 611, 612 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; In re
Amtorg Trading Corporation, 75 F. (2d) 826, 834 (C. C. P. A. 1935).
11. 255 U. S. 50 (1921) (italics added).
12. See Foster D. Snell v. Potters, 88 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
13. See Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Columbus Malleable Iron Co., 35 F. Supp. 603
(S. D. Ohio 1940); Engler v. General Electric Co., 29 F. Supp. 421 (S. D. N. Y. 1939);
White v. Reach, 26 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (jurisdiction of copyright infringe-
ment did not give jurisdiction of a cause of action for conspiring to prevent plaintiff
from securing auditions, or of a cause of action for wrongfully inducing breach of con-
tract). See also Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
19 F. Supp. 769 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), where the complaint alleging copyright infringe-
ment stated no cause of action and a "second cause of action" alleging unfair competi-
tion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
14. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315
(1938) ; Winthrop Chemical Co. v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 94 F. (2d) 587 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938) ; Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 7th,
1937) (suit under Declaratory Judgment Act) ; Warner Publications v. Popular Publica-
tions, 87 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Under-
wear Corp., 17 F. Supp. 783 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), rev'd on merits, 92 F. (2d) 33 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 640 (1938). Judge Woolsey wrote in Corning Glass
Works v. Pasmantier, 30 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), "I understand that where,
as here, the use of the trade-mark is the basis of the federal claim for infringement, and
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Not only is there disharmony among the rulings of the several circuits on
this issue, 15 but rulings by different judges in the same circuit are sometimes
not in strict rapport.' Particularly difficult to reconcile are the decisions
of the Second Circuit. In Treasure Imports v. Henry Jtmdur and Sons, 7
M1usher Foundation v. .41ba Trading Company,"s and Pure Oil Company 2'.
Puritan Oil Company,'0 that court had an opportunity to define its piisition
more clearly, but the three opinions leave the law on the subject more un-
settled than ever. These decisions employed three separate criteria for the
resolution of the jurisdictional problems involved: whether the plaintiff had
any federal right at the time the unfair competition occurred; whether the
federal and non-federal claims were "inextricably interwoven"; and whether
the federal claim presented was "plainly unsubstantial." The test of diversity
of citizenship, traditionally important if not determinative per se of the issue
of improper joinder,2 0 was not discussed in any of the three opinions.
In Treasure Imports v. Henry Aindur and Sons, "-! t the Second Circuit
refused to assume jurisdiction over that part of the allegation of unfair com-
petition which was based upon acts occurring prior to registration of the
trade-mark on the ground that no federal right then existed. While it is true
that by he Trade-Mark Act of 1905,- no damages are allowed for infringe-
ment except for the period after the mark has been registered and proper
notice given,23 there is no like statutory prohibition against unfair competi-
tion.2 4 Since a claim of unfair competition for acts occurring after regis-
tration, in no wise a federal claim,2  may be combined with a claim for in-
the vethod of sing the trade-mark is the real basis for the claim of unfair competition,
the derivative jurisdiction prescribed by the Supreme Court may be invoked. This, of
course, is in accordance with the wise principal of judicial husbandry, that-if juriEdic-
tionally permissible-two causes should never be allowed to grow where at first there
was but one." See also Keystone Macaroni Mfg. Cu. v. Arena & Sons, 27 F. Supp. 290
(E. D. Pa. 1939) (even though it is found during the course of trial that the assignment
of the trade-mark was not registered as required by Trade-Mark Act) ;, Time, Inc. v.
Barshay, 27 F. Supp. 870 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (even though the trade-mar: is not in-
fringed); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Lily-Tulip Cup Corp., 15 F. Supp. 393, 395
(E. D. N. Y. 1936).
15. For a discussion of the conflicting decisions on this question, see 1 MluoI. Frti-
ERAL PRAT cC (Supp. 1942) 81-85.
16. Compare L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272, 274 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934) with Foster D. Snell v. Potters, 88 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
17. 127 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
18. 127 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
19. 127 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. 127 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
22. 33 STAT. 730 (1905), 15 U. S. C. § 107 (1940).
23. See Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 255 U. S. 50 (1921); Rossman v. Gamier, 211
Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
24. See Laurence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537 (1891); Putnam
Nail Co. v. Bennett, 43 Fed. 800 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1890) ; Pinaud v. Huebschman, 27
F. (2d) 531 (E. D. N. Y. 1928).
25. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thump-
son Co., 169 Fed. 833, 834 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1909).
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fringement, 26 there seems no compelling reason why unfair acts which took
place before registration, constituting merely another non-federal claim, should
not also be joined. If the rationale behind retention of unfair competition
claims properly joined with federal issues is valid, the same argument would
seem to be valid for all unfair competition arising out of the same fact
pattern. Further, Stark Brothers Company v. Stark,27 relied on by the ma-
jority, was considered overruled by the Hurn case in one Second Circuit
opinion by Judge Learned Hand. 28  Possibly the absolute doctrine of the
Treasure Imports case, that the federal courts may not have jurisdiction over
any unfair acts occurring before registration, should be supplanted by a more
pragmatic test. Since the federal courts retain jurisdiction over claims of
unfair competition largely in order to prevent multiplicity of suits," the
same practical consideration would be served by an extension of the present
rule and the abolition of the distinction made in the Treasure Imports case.
The best practice would seem to be to inquire whether the proof necessary
to establish the various unfair acts is substantially identical and not to solve
the jurisdictional question solely ,on the issue of whether the acts occurred
before or after registration.
This test, whether the plaintiff is alleging a single cause of action with two
grounds or two distinct causes, was made determinative of the jurisdictional
issue in Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Company. The plaintiff al-
leged that defendant had infringed three of his patents and been unfair
in advertising his products with words in which plaintiff had a common law
right. The district court dismissed the second cause of action for lack of
jurisdiction. Asserting that in the absence of diversity of citizenship no
federal jurisdiction might be had over common law claims not inextricably
26. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S. 315
(1938).
27. 255 U. S. 50 (1921).
28. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272, 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
29. This objective of avoiding duplication of litigation goes back to the original de-
cision of Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823
(U. S. 1824), holding that "when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power
of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other ques-
tions of fact or of lav may be involved in it."
Although conceding that problems of allotment of jurisdiction between state and
national governments are fundamentally problems of government calling for wise and
shrewd statesmanship, Judge Clark, dissenting in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, 108 F. (2d)
16, 18,20 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), stated that "there will be no loss to statecraft if in the daily
activities of courts the needs of practical judicial administration may have some sway to
persuade against compelling two lawsuits where one will more completely serve the in-
terests of the litigants." Judge Clark expressed this idea again in his dissent in Musher
Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. (2d) 9, 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), when he stated,
"If the roast must be reserved exclusively for the federal bench, it is anotnalous to send
the gravy across the street to the state court house." See also Derman v. Gersten, 22 F.
Supp. 877 (E. D. N. Y. 1938); Mitchell & Weber v. Williamsbridge Mills, 14 F. Supp.
954 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
30. 127 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
926 [Vol. 52
interwoven with the federal issue, a majority of the circuit court voted to
affirm. In a vigorous dissent,3' judge Clark advocated that the test of juris-
diction be whether there is substantial overlapping testimony in the proof
of the federal and non-federal claims, not whether the proofs necessary to
establish the claims are identical.
While it would seem that federal courts should not allow themselves to
be victimized by plaintiffs who are actually alleging two separate and distinct
claims, it is difficult to ascertain the benefits to be had by such a narrow co n-
struction of the Hur rule as is found in the Musher case. Such a decision,
forcing plaintiffs to seek redress for infringed manufacturing methods in one
forum, and advertising methods in another, where only one product is con-
cerned, seems to violate the simplest dictates of judicial economy.
3 2
The third test, whether the federal claim presented is a substantial one,
does not lead to such duplication of effort. In Pure Oil Company ',. Puritan
Oil Company,33 the district and circuit courts differed as to whether retail
sale of gasoline at a local service station could support a claim of trade-mark
infringement in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, although reaching op-
posite results on the facts, both opinions employed the criterion of "sub-
stantiality" in resolving the jurisdictional issue. Both reiterated the rule that
when a federal claim with which it is joined is found "plainly unsubstantial,"
the complaint of unfair competition may not be heard. This test has much
to recommend it. Wherever the federal claim can be dismissed prior to trial
because of its lack of substance, the necessity for two trials is eliminated.
And the criterion is a flexible device for barring from the federal court.-
causes in which full relief may be obtained elsewhere.
Moreover, it would seem that the test, if coupled with the liberal inter-
pretation of the Hum rule urged by judge Clark in the Musher case, would
meet the highest standards of judicial economy and common sense. The "sub-
stantiality" test would operate as a convenient legal device for dismissing at
the outset complaints which try to smuggle non-federal claims into the federal
courts by joinder with unsubstantial federal rights. And judge Clark's test
of overlapping testimony would act as a practical method of keeping com-
mon law claims unrelated to federal causes out of the federal courts.
Neither of the two considerations usually argued against the extension of
federal power over non-federal matters is applicable in infringement cases.3 1
Federal judges who advocate a narrow construction of the Hurn doctrine
are often prompted by a fear lest the federal courts be made the battle-
ground for purely personal litigation,33 such as small tort claims.3 6 Alss
31. Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. (2d) 9, 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
32. In commenting on the Hun case, Shulman and Jaegerman stated that "to tile
extent that it adjudicated the claim of unfair competition, the decisiun is obviously cal-
culated to economize on the expense and time of litigants and on the expense and time
of courts." Shulman and Jaegerman, supra note 1, at 400.
33. 127 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
34. See Comment (1933) 33 Co- L. REv. 296, 293.
35. International Harvest Hat Co. v. Caradine Hat Co., 17 F. Supp. 79 (E. D. Mo.
1935).
36. Engler v. General Electric Co., 29 F. Supp. 421 (S. D. N4. Y. 1939).
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they are not anxious to construe state statutes unnecessarily 7 or to mix
in local political problems.38 Suits for infringement and unfair competition,
however, almost never involve such local issues. Nor can-it be said that the
principal cases might better be resolved in the state courts, for through prac-
tice federal judges have acquired a certain skill and dexterity in the disposi-
tion of this type of litigation. Further, since the plaintiff must resort to the
federal courts for half his redress, he cannot gain full relief in a single suit
in any other forum.
But there is a still stronger reason why such a narrow construction of the
Hum rule as is found in the Musher and Treasure Imports cases is undesir-
able. This is the effect such an interpretation will have in the application of
the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.3 9 It can be argued that such cases
should be made an exception to the Tompkins rule, federal courts to apply
federal "common law" rather than applicable state law. 40 But the confusion
which would result from deciding part of the case on federal law and part
on state law is readily imaginable. Also there would be the difficulty of ascer-
taining which state law to apply when there was unfair competition in forty-
eight states.41 To quote a recent treatment of the effect of the Tompkins case
on trade-mark law, "The application of different sources of governing law to
various issues in the same lawsuit will create endless complications and re-
sult in fine-spun distinctions that will make Swift v. Tyson look like child's
play." 42
DISTRAINT ON A DELINQUENT TAXPAYER'S LIFE INSURANCE
POLICY FROM THE INSURERS*
To meet the imperative need for expeditious collection of taxes, section
3690 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes summary distraint on and sale
of a delinquent taxpayer's "goods, chattels, or effects, including stocks,
securities, bank accounts, and evidences of debt."' Although distraint is
37. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432 (1923).
38. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920).
39. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
40. In Time, Inc. v. Viobin Corp., 128 F. (2d) 860, 862 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), the
court, although holding that common law claims of unfair competition were to be resolved
in accordance with "local law," stated, "We are of the opinion that trade-mark infringe-
ment, in view of the Federal Statute providing for registration presents an exception
to the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, and is to be determined by general federal law."
See also Rytex v. Ryan, 126 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
41. See Chafee, Unfair Competition (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1299-1301.
42. See Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins and Trade Marks (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 954, 988.
* United States v. Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co., 127 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 1st,
1942); United States v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 130 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942); United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
1. INT. REV. CODE (1939) § 3690 reads: "If any person liable to pay any taxes
neglects or refuses to pay the same within ten days after notice and demand, it shall be
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provided as an alternative to the more cumbersome civil action under section
3678, the two remedies are not wholly in pari materia 2 since the former
mentions specifically only certain personal property while the latter includes
all "property and rights to property, whether real or p2rsonal." a
Courts have, however, minimized the differences between the two remedies
by construing section 3690 to include practically all forms of personal prop-
erty. In allowing distraint on choses in action not expressly mentioned in
section 3690, such as a debt owed to a taxpayer 4 they have deemed the specific
enumeration of intangibles in that section explanatory rather than restrictive
in character.5 Thus an insured taxpayer's interest in a life insurance policy
has been held distrainable under section 3690 when he has reserved the power
to take its cash surrender value and to change the beneficiary and when by
local law the beneficiary's interest is "contingent" rather than "vested." o
lawful for the collector or his deputy to collect the said taxes, with such interest and other
additional amounts as are required by law, by distraint and sale, in the manner provided
in this subchapter, of the goods, chattels, or effects, including stocks, securities, bank ac-
counts, and evidences of debt, of the person delinquent as aforesaid." Collection of taxes
by summary distraint has been held procedural due process. Springer v. Unitel States,
102 U. S. 586 (1880). For the constitutionality of distraint, see BREWsTER, DisRLmUr
UNDER THE FEDERAL REvENUE LAws (1937) 9-12.
2. See Blacklock v. United States, 208 U. S. 75, 136 (190) ; see Matter of Rosen-
berg, 269 N. Y. 247, 252, 199 N. E. 206, 208 (1935).
3. I.Nr. REv. CoDE (1939) §3678(a) reads: "(a) Filing. In any case where there
has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, and it has become necessary to seize and
sell property and rights to property, whether real or personal, to satisfy the same, whether
distraint proceedings have been commenced or not, the Attorney General at the request
of the Commissioner may direct a civil action to be filed, in a district court of the United
States, to enforce the lien of the United States for tax upon any property and rights to
property, whether real or personal, or to subject any such property and rights to prop-
erty owned by the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the pay-
ment of such tax."
4. See United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 28 F. Supp. 907 (D. N. J. 1939), rcv'd on other grounds,
112 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). But see United States v. Western Union, 50 F.
(2d) 102, 103 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
5. "We do not believe, in the light of the sweeping language used throughout these
statutes, that Congress intended to limit distraint to tangible property and to the sp ci-
fled classes of intangibles." Canon v. Nicholas, 80 F. (2d) 934, 936 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
6. Kyle v. McGuirk, 82 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936); Canon v. Nicholas, S9 F.
(2d) 934 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935). See Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 945; t1936) 49 Hnv.
L. REV. 660.
State statutes exempting insurance proceeds as against creditors are not applicable.
Ibid.
In the interest of national uniformity, distraint should be allowed even when local
law characterizes the beneficiary's interest as "vested" rather titan "contingent." It is
unjust to permit taxpayers in the same economic position to be burdened differently be-
cause of local property law "labels." Cf. Burnet v. Harmel, 237 U. S. 103 (1932) ; PAUL,
STruDams IN FazRAr TAXATio, SEcoxn Saams (1938) 49-50. But cf. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U. S. 101 (1930). See Note (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 945, 947. A majority of jurirdic-
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Nevertheless a difficult problem arises when the collector is unable to seize
the policy from the insured and seeks to reach its surrender value directly
from the insurance company under section 3710, which requires a third per-
son "in possession" of "property, or rights to property," of a taxpayer sub-
ject to distraint to surrender it to the collector tinder penalty of being held
liable for its value.7 In this situation, insurance companies in order to save
the policy have refused to surrender its cash value, contending that an insurer
is not "in possession" of "property" within the meaning of the statute.
Three circuit courts of appeals in cases involving essentially the same
factual pattern 8 have recently held that section 3710 gives the Government
no right to distrain the surrender value on a life insurance policy from the
insurer. Delinquent taxpayers had reserved the power to change the bene-
ficiaries of their life insurance policies and an option to take the cash value
at any time upon surrender of the policies. When served with warrants of
distraint, the insurers refused to surrender the cash value of the policies and
the Government brought actions against them under section 3710 for the value
of the property not surrendered. Although local law characterized the bene-
ficiaries' interests as "contingent," the three courts agreed that the insurance
companies were not liable, holding that an insurer is not "in possession" of
"property" belonging to the insured. The First and Third Circuits declared
that the insurer's obligation does not accrue until the insured personally elects
to take the cash value and surrenders the policy. The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, employing a strict interpretation of section 3710, stated that
satisfaction of intangible obligations, such as payment of a debt, does not
amount to "surrender" of "property" in the obligor's possession. This court
emphasized the original purpose and setting of section 3710 and, by impliedly
narrowing its scope to the physical surrender of tangible personalty, dis-
tinguished a sale on distress from a garnishment proceeding.
The Second Circuit's interpretation would seem to be in accord with the
original function of section 3710. Since this section was designed to imple-
tions, however, deem the beneficiary's interest "contingent." See Vance, The Beneficiary's
Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 343, 359.
7. INT. REv. CODE (1939) §3710 reads: "Surrender of property subject to dis-
traint-
"(a) Requirement. Any person in possession of property, or rights to property, sub-
ject to distraint, upon which a levy has been made, shall, upon demand by the collector
or deputy collector making such levy, surrender such property or rights to such collector
or deputy, unless such property or right is, at the time of such demand, subject to an
attachment or execution under any judicial process.
"(b) Penalty for violation. Any person who fails or refuses to so surrender any
of such property or rights shall be liable in his own person and estate to the United
States in a sum equal to the value of the property or rights not so surrendered, but not
exceeding the amount of the taxes (including penalties and interest) for the collection
of which such levy has been made, together with costs and interest from the date of such
levy."
8. United States v. Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co., 127 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 1st,
1942); United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F. (2d) 149 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ;
United States v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 130 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). See
(1941) 55 HAuv. L. REv. 153.
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ment distraint by requiring surrender to the collector of delinquent taxpayer's
property in possession of third persons. it was probably intended to refer
only to personal property which could be physically seized. The courts have.
however, stretched the language of the section to cover intangible obligations.
Thus payment by a bank of a taxpayer's deposit has been deemed "surrender"
of "property" in the bank's possession.10 And the distinction between gar-
nishment and distraint proceedings, emphasized by the Second Circuit, has
been ignored." Moreover, the inclusion of intangibles under section 3710
would, in view of the increasing accumulation of wealth in this form, %eeni
to be in keeping with the comprehensive scheme of tax collection set up by
the statute.
Recognizing the distrainability of intangibles in possession of third per-
sons, the First and Third Circuits relied heavily on state garnishment cases
in holding "election" to take a policy's cash value and its surrender condi-
tions precedent to the accrual of the insurer's obligation. 12 Those decisions,
9. For the common law origins and history of distraint, see BREvsam, DIsTAM.NT
UNDER THE F~mER REvFxuE LAws (1937) 4-8.
10. Commonwealth Bank v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. bth, 1940);
McKenzie v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); United States v.
Bank of Shelby, 68 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); United States v. Bank of the
United States, 5 F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; ef. United States v. Lcing Island Drug
Co., 115 F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Karno-Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 F. (2d) 690
(C. C. A. 3d, 1940). But see United States v. Western Union, 50 F. (2d) 102, 103 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1931).
See United States v. Warren R. R., 127 F. (2d) 134, 137 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942),
where the Second Circuit Court declared, by way of dicta, that ". . . the indebtedness of
a third party to a taxpayer is subject to distraint and upon demand must be surrendered
to the collector by virtue of § 3710."
11. The functional similarity between distraint and garnishment has been recognized
by some courts. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F. (2d) 9,3, 937
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) C('We find nothing in § 3690 or § 3710 which varies the general rule
that a garnishee process is not to be extended to future earnings, but will only reach an
indebtedness which has accrued."); United States v. Bank of the United States, 5 F.
Supp. 942, 945 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
12. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. National Life Ins. Co., I1 Ga. 793, 131 S. E.
902, 44 A. L. R. 1184, 1188 (1926); Isaac Van Dyke Co. v. Moll, 241 Mich. 255, 217 X.
IV. 29, 57 A. L. R. 692, 695 (1928); Boisseau v. Bass, 100 Va. 207, 40 S. E. (47 (1902) ;
Columbia Bank v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the United States, 79 App. Div.
601, 80 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't 1903) ; cf. Drysh v. Prudential Ins. Co., 237 IM. App.
68, 4 N. E. (2d) 530 (1936); Bethards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 287 II. App. 7,
4 N. E. (2d) 257 (1936); Chelsea Exchange Bank Y. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 App. Div.
829, 160 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1916). For severe criticisms of these state garnishment cases,
see Cohen, The Attachment of Life Insurance Policies (1941) 26 Coax. L Q. 213,
Execution Process and Life Insurance (1939) 39 COL L. REv. 139, 166 et se,1. A numeri-
cal minority of courts have permitted attachment of life policies by the creditor of the
insured. Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 222 Mo.
App. 1228, 3 S. XV. (2d) 1046 (1928) ; Kratzenstein v. Lehman, 18 Misc. 590, 42 N. Y.
Supp. 237 (N. Y. City Cts. 1896), aff'd, 19 Misc. 600, 44 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't
1897) (endowment policy); Scobie v. Connor, 94 Misc. 429, 157 N. Y. Supp. 567 (Sup.
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however, involved attempts by ordinary creditors to reach an insured's in-
terest in a policy and turned upon local statutes. Since the courts were not,
therefore, bound by them, they might well have considered the functions of
election and surrender as related to insurance policies in determining whether
the policies' cash values were subject to distraint.
The purpose of surrender 13 is to protect the insurer from being held
doubly liable on a policy-once to the Government and once to the insured.
14
If, however, after a judicial decision that under the federal statute surrender
is not necessary for distraint an insurer should pay a policy's cash value to
the collector pursuant to the statute, it would seem that he would have a good
defense of payment in a subsequent action upon the contract by the insured.
Unlike surrender, election is little more than a formality. Institutionally, a pol-
icy's cash value-the excess of premiums paid over current insurance protec-
tion 15-is like a savings account since these accumulated funds are always at
the taxpayer's disposal and must be listed by the insurer in a reserve as a "li-
ability." 16 Such a functional view, coupled with those authorities holding
a savings account distrainable from a bank without an "election" to take the
deposit and surrender of the passbook, 17 would have led to court approval
of distraint of a delinquent taxpayer's savings in a life policy's reserve.
Ct. 1916); cf. Cavagnaro v. Thompson, 78 Misc. 687, 138 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct.
1912); Elleson v. Straw, 119 Wis. 502, 97 N. W. 168 (1903).
13. When surrender of the policy is impossible, courts have dispensed with the re-
quirement. Cf. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, 247 U. S. 394 (1918)
(". . . requirements of that character are made for the protection of the society. .. .")
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U. S. v. Miller, 185 F. 98 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Wil-
cox v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 173 N. Y. 50, 65 N. E. 857 (1903). See VANCE,
INsURANCE (1930) § 148. But courts have insisted on surrender of the policy when the
insurer would otherwise be in danger of double liability. Cf. Martin v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 104 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), 124 A. L. R. 1163, 1167 (1940) ("If in
the instant case . . . a showing could be made that the policies had been destroyed or
for other sufficient reasons could not be surrendered, and that the insurer's interest would
not be jeopardized by the payment of the cash value of the policies . . ., no doubt the
plaintiff would be entitled to a judgment for the cash surrender value without surrender
of the policies. . . .") ; Hatcher v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 134 Ga. 652, 68 S. E.
581 (1910) ; Maurice v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 121 Misc. 427, 201 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup.
Ct. 1923).
14. When served with the warrant of distraint, the insurer could notify the insured
and ask him to choose whether the payment to the collector should be treated as a loan
or as a complete surrender of the policy. A court could condition the insurer's defense of
payment on its having notified the insured. Legislative or administrative ruling allow-
ing the insured a short period of time to find the money and thus save the policy, as in the
Bankruptcy Act, would seem desirable. For the procedure in bankruptcy, see 4 CoLAIa,
BANKRUPTCY (Moore's ed. 1942) 1121-22.
15. See VANCE, INSURANCE (1930) §§ 20-22.
16. See generally, Vickrey, Intrurance Under the Federal Income Tax (1943) 52
YALE L. J. 554, 560; Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance (1941) 55 HARv. L. REv. 226, 250.
17. See Commonwealth Bank v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 327 (C. C. A. 6th,
1940) ; McKenzie v. United States, 109 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) ; United States
v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) ; United States v. Bank of the
United States, 5 F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
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NOTES
These decisions will probably afford neither the insured nor insurers any
substantial benefit, for the collector in most cases can reach the cash values
under section 3678. Their net effect will, therefore, be to compel the col-
lector to utilize the more expensive and cumbersome action provided by this;
section.
Because of the traditional judicial policy of protecting life insurance, the
courts in these, as in the garnishment cases.18 may have been hesitant to im-
pose any burden on insurers not specifically sanctioned by statute. If, how-
ever, Congress intended such protection, it could have adopted state exemp-
tion statutes, as it did in the Bankruptcy Act,'0 or included life insurance
policies in the property specifically exempted under section 3691.23 Moreover,
although distraint should perhaps be limited to policies exceeding a certain
low maximum, the increasing utilization of insurance for investment rather
than pure insurance purposes 2 ' and the urgent need for prompt collection
of taxes would seem to render legislative or judicial exemption of life in-
surance policies highly undesirable.
18. See, e.g., Isaac Van Dyke Co. v. Moll, 241 Mich. 255, 217 N. W. 29, 57 A. L. R.
692, 695 (192) ("If garnishment will here lie, it could be enforced by a creditor were the
insured at the time of service lying on a sick bed with dissolution near at hand.").
19. 30 STAT. 565-66 (1899), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (1941); see Cohen v. Samuels, 245
U. S. 50 (1917); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 (1913).
20. IxT. Rrv. CODE (1939) § 3691.
21. ". . . insurance has long served to an alarming degree as a L.x avoidance instru-
mentality." See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND Gnrr TAXATioN (1942) 570. See 1 PAuL,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girn TAxATIoN (1942) c. 10, especially § 10.29; Vickrey, op. cit.
supra note 16, 560-70, 584-85. ". . . exemptions conceived in a desire to encourage a
valuable institution are missing their function." "An alert re-exanmination of the social
functions of life insurance is certainly demanded." See Paul, Life Instrance and the
Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 HAnv. L. Rm. 1037, 1076. This change in policy is evi-
denced by the recent elimination of the $40,000 exemption for insurance from the federal
estate tax. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404. Compare the foregoing authorities with the old
view, well exemplified in WooDs, THE SOcIOLoGY OF LIFE INSU1ANC (1928), especially
at 300-11 (". . . inordinate taxation of life insurance is not only economically unsound,
but socially unjust").
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